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From the Right to Work to Freedom
from Work
Introduction to the Human Economy
Nicolas BUENO*
It may appear to be paradoxical to celebrate work as a human right in an economic system in
which for many work is associated with activities that are rather repetitive or stressful, sometimes
meaningless, and seldom freely chosen. After presenting the content and historical origins of the
human right to work, as defined in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, this article argues that the right to work cannot be universally fulfilled in
the contemporary state-centred global economy. Moving beyond economic discussions placing too
much attention on how to provide enough but sometimes unfulfilling work, the article examines
the human potential to reduce the need to work. It outlines the theoretical and definitional
foundations of the ‘human economy’, where human potential and creativity are rewarded in order
to make the transition from the right to work to the freedom from work. The human economy is a
potentialist approach in which the right to be free to choose work plays an increasing role
1 INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars refer to a human right to work, that may be regarded as a valuable
activity contributing to human flourishing1 or as a source of identity,2 self-
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1 Alan Bogg, Only Fools and Horses: Some Sceptical Reflections on the Right to Work, in The Right to Work:
Legal and Philosophical Perspectives 149, 152 (Virginia Mantouvalou ed., Hart 2015), considering work as
one valuable activity among others; Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1881, 1883
(2000), contributing to human flourishing or devastation.
2 Ibid., 1890.
realization or fulfilment.3 Work is also ‘instrumentally valuable as a source of
income to enable us to live’.4 For most people, it is certainly this income that is
demanded above all else through the right to work. This article puts forward
the view that socialist and capitalist economic systems are not fully equipped to
provide the economic security that human beings attempt to find through
work. This is because both systems focus too much on how to provide enough
work. As a result, existing systems overlook the human potential to reduce a
society’s need to rely on work that people would prefer not to do if they had a
choice.
Section 2 outlines the content of the human right to work about which
many individuals feel ambivalent,5 despite the near universal willingness of
states to recognize it as a human right. The right to work, as defined in
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), entails the opportunity to earn a living by working and
the right to decide freely to choose and accept work. Section 3 provides an
historical understanding of the right to work. Since its official birth as a socialist
ideal in the middle of the nineteenth century, the claim to work has recurred
after each unemployment crisis, and it is significant that articles like this one
have increased in the past decade.6
In the contemporary global economy, workers are increasingly exposed
to global competition and labour-saving technologies. It is doubtful whether
this economic system is able to provide the amount of work of good quality
that would be required to satisfy the human right to work. Section 4
examines how to increase a society’s freedom from work as an alternative
to safeguarding the right to work. It does not put forward a practical legal
proposal but discusses the new definitional and theoretical framework of the
human economy, which focuses on human beings and their potential to reduce
the need to rely on work. Without adopting a socialist approach, the human
economy challenges the core of capitalism, in which human beings are
reduced to a form of productive capital. The human economy is a potentialist
approach in which the human right to choose work plays an increasing role in
expanding a society’s freedom from work.
3 Guy Davidov, A Purposive Approach to Labour Law 43 (Oxford University Press 2016), does not deny
the existence, and importance, of negative aspects to work.
4 Bogg, supra n. 1, at 150.
5 Guy Mundlak, Working Out the Right to Work in a Global Labour Market, in The Right to Work: Legal and
Philosophical Perspectives 291, 293 (Virginia Mantouvalou ed., Hart 2015).
6 See e.g. The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Virginia Mantouvalou ed., Hart 2015),
for sixteen contributions on the right to work.
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2 THE UNIVERSAL RECOGNITION OF THE HUMAN RIGHT
TO WORK
2.1 UNIVERSAL RECOGNITION
The right to work is a human right, at least as a matter of positive international
law.7 At the universal level, the right to work is explicitly laid down in Article 23
paragraph 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 6
of the ICESCR.8 The United States, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Singapore are
among the few countries that have not ratified the ICESCR, although the United
States was an influential promoter of the right to work within the redaction of the
UDHR.9
The right to work is safeguarded in all regions. Chronologically, it was laid
down in Article 1 of the European Social Charter, Article 15 of the African
Charter on Human and People’s Rights, Article 6 of the Additional Protocol to
the American Convention on Human Rights, Article 1 of the Revised European
Social Charter, Article 15 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, Article 30 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights, and, albeit not a legally
binding international treaty, Article 27 of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations Human Rights Declaration.10
Finally, the right to work is included in numerous national constitutions in
different political or economic systems. The right to work exists, for example, in
the Afghan, Algerian, Chinese,11 Danish, Dutch, French, Indian, Italian, Japanese,
Polish, Romanian, Russian, Slovakian, South Korean, and Spanish constitutions.12
This article examines, as others have before,13 why some individuals do not have
the economic security that should result from work despite this universal recogni-
tion of the right to work.
7 Bogg, supra n. 1, at 150.
8 See also U.N. Comm. Econ. Soc. Cult. Rts. (CESCR), General Comment 18: The Right to Work,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (24 Nov. 2005) [hereinafter CESCR General Comment 18].
9 Philip Harvey, Why Is the Right to Work So Hard to Secure?, in The State of Economic and Social Human
Rights: A Global Overview 135, 154–155 (Lanse Minkler ed., Cambridge University Press 2013).
10 See Ben Saul et al., Article 6: The Right to Work, in The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases, and Materials 271, 386–391 (Oxford University Press 2014), for
differences between regional human rights treaties; see also Angelika Nußberger, Right to Work,
International Protection, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law para. 11 (Rüdiger
Wolfrum ed., online ed. Oxford University Press 2007).
11 See generally, Haina Lu, The Right to Work in China: Chinese Labor Legislation in the Light of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 85 (Intersentia 2015).
12 Nußberger, supra n. 10, para. 6.
13 James W. Nickel, Is There a Human Right to Employment?, 10 Phil. F. 149 (1978); Jon Elster, Is There (or
Should There Be) a Right to Work?, in Democracy and the Welfare State 53 (Amy Gutman ed., Princeton
University Press 1988); Hugh Collins, Is There a Human Right to Work?, in The Right to Work 17, supra
n. 1; Kurt Pärli, Gibt es ein Recht auf Arbeit?, Basler juristische Mitteilungen 117–139 (2017).
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2.2 THE CONTENT OF THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WORK
The right to work is sometimes described as imprecise14 or as a cluster of
complex normative values.15 It may be argued that Article 23 paragraph 1
UDHR is confusing because it is a package in one single sentence consisting
of four different elements including the right to work, to free choice of
employment, to just and favourable conditions of work, and to protection
against unemployment. Article 6 paragraph 1 ICESCR is more specific. It
defines the two core elements16 of the right to work: ‘the right to work
[ … ] includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his [sic] living
by work which he [sic] freely chooses or accepts’.17 This section discusses how
human rights bodies and the literature interpret these18 elements. A critical
assessment will follow in section 4.
2.2[a] The Right to the Opportunity to Earn a Living by Work
The right to the opportunity to earn a living by work means in the first place that
states must take measures to ensure that work is available. In this regard, states
parties to the ICESCR ‘must adopt, as quickly as possible, measures aiming at
achieving full employment’.19 More specifically, states parties are required to
formulate and implement ‘an employment policy with a view to stimulating
economic growth and development, raising levels of living, meeting manpower
requirements and overcoming unemployment and underemployment’.20 Although
there is no absolute and unconditional right to obtain employment,21 states must
progressively realize the right by implementing employment policies with the
maximum available resources.22
14 Collins, supra n. 13, at 20.
15 Krzysztof Drzewicki, The Right to Work and Rights in Work, in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 169,
173 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds, 2d rev. ed., Nijhoff 2001).
16 See Colm O’Cinneide, The Right to Work in International Human Rights Law, in The Right to Work,
supra n. 6, at 109.
17 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Art. 6 para. 1, 16 Dec. 1966, 993 U.
N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
18 But see Jeremy Sarkin-Hughes & Mark Koenig, Developing the Right to Work: Intersection and Dialoguing
Human Rights and Economic Policy, 33 Hum. Rts. Q. 1, 13 (2011), dividing the right to work into three
elements, separating the guarantee against arbitrary dismissal.
19 CESCR General Comment 18, supra n. 8, para. 19. See Sarkin-Hughes & Koenig, supra n. 18, at 16,
citing Matthew C. R. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 206
(Clarendon 1995).
20 CESCR General Comment 18, supra n. 8, para. 26. General Comment 18 adopts the same wording as
Art. 1 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Employment Policy Convention 1964 (No.
122).
21 See Saul et al., supra n. 10, at 282.
22 CESCR General Comment 18, supra n. 8, para. 32; see also Saul et al., supra n. 10, at 282.
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In addition to aiming at full employment, states must safeguard the right to
equal access to work. To ensure accessibility, states should first promote equality of
opportunity to earn a living. In this regard, particular attention should be given to
disadvantaged or marginalized groups, such as women,23 older people, young
people,24 people with disabilities, migrant workers, refugees, minorities, or indi-
genous peoples.25 Insufficient expenditure or misallocation of public funds in this
regard may amount to a violation of the right to equal access to work.26 Finally, in
addition to equal opportunities to access to work, everyone has the right to access
employment without discrimination. States are required to avoid discrimination
when employing individuals and adopt measures to protect them from discrimina-
tion when employed in the private sector.27 The prohibition on discrimination
extends to all aspects of employment from recruitment to termination.28
2.2[b] The Right to Freely Accept or Choose Work
2.2[b][i] The Right to Reject Assigned Work
It is traditionally recognized under the right to work that there is a right not to be
‘forced in any way whatsoever to exercise or engage in employment’.29 According
to the Forced or Compulsory Labour Convention, an individual is forced to work
when work is ‘exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for
which the said person has not offered himself [sic] voluntarily’.30 In General
Comment 18, the CESCR also refers to the Abolition of Forced Labour
Convention, emphasizing the question of forced labour imposed by governments.31
One practical question in this regard is the extent to which a government can
‘motivate’ individuals to accept work that is not considered desirable. A duty to
work exists in many national constitutions, such as Angola, China, Italy, Japan,
South Korea, Spain and Vietnam.32 Generally, however, international human
23 See e.g. CESCR, Concluding Observations: Senegal para. 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/18 (5 Jan.
1994); CESCR, Concluding Observations: Republic of Korea, para. 14, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/ KOR/
CO/3 (17 Dec. 2009) or CESCR, Concluding Observations: Italy para. 27, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/ITA/
CO/5 (28 Oct. 2015). See generally Saul et al., supra n. 10, at 289.
24 See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Viet Nam para. 17, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/VNM/CO/2-4 (15
Dec. 2014) or CESCR, Italy, supra n. 23, para. 24. See generally Saul et al. supra n. 10, at 302.
25 Ibid., at 289–292.
26 CESCR General Comment 18, supra n. 4, para. 36.
27 Ibid., para. 25.
28 Saul et al., supra n. 10, at 282.
29 CESCR, General Comment 18, supra n. 8, para. 6.
30 Ibid., para. 9. Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour Art. 2, paras 1–2, 28
June 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55. See generally Saul et al., supra n. 10, at 323.
31 See Lee Swepston, The Development in International Law of Articles 23 and 24 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights: The Labor Rights Articles 46 (Brill 2014).
32 Nußberger, supra n. 10, para. 6.
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rights instruments do not lay down a duty to work as an obligation of the
individual towards society.33 A right to refuse assigned work is of practical
importance in the case of states ‘motivating’ unemployed persons to accept any
job on penalty of reducing or suspending unemployment support or other social
benefits. The right to work in this respect is limited to the freedom of the
individual not to take up employment that is ‘unsuitable’.34
2.2[b][ii] The Right Not to Be Forced to Accept Indecent Work?
It is one thing to increase the availability of work and to ensure in practice that
such work is accessible and not forcibly imposed, but it is quite another to ensure
that the quality of the work made available is acceptable. Acceptable means that
work must at least be decent35 and respect the right to just and favourable
conditions of work as safeguarded by Article 7 ICESCR. Article 7 ensures
remuneration that provides workers, as a minimum, with fair wages and a decent
living for themselves and their families, safe and healthy working conditions, equal
opportunities for promotion, rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working
hours, and periodic paid holidays.36
It is important to clarify that under the terms of the right to work, the work
made available must be decent. This is particularly important in times of economic
crisis to prevent states reducing labour standards to create more jobs that do not
meet acceptable standards. In an awareness of this risk, General Comment 18 of the
CESCR states that ‘specific measures to increase the flexibility of labour markets
must not render work less stable or reduce the social protection of the worker’.37
Under international law, there is a right to available, accessible, and decent
work. As a corollary, there should also be a corresponding negative right not to be
forced to accept indecent work. If such a right exists in theory, it is questionable
whether the contemporary economic system can safeguard it in practice.
According to the World Employment and Social Outlook report, global
33 Olivier De Schutter, Welfare State Reform and Social Rights 33 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts 123, 143 (2015). But
see Art. XXX of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and Art. 29 of the African
Charter on Human and People’s Right; see also Amir Paz-Fuchs, The Right to Work and the Duty to
Work, in The Right to Work 182–189, supra n. 6, for further examples.
34 In the meaning of Art. 20(f) ILO Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment
Convention (No. 168). See De Schutter, supra n. 33, at 125.
35 CESCR, General Comment 18, supra n. 8, para. 7.
36 See generally CESCR, General Comment 23: The Right to Just and Favourable Conditions of Work,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/23 (27 Apr. 2016), with references to all relevant ILO instruments and Saul et
al., supra n. 10, at 393–483. See also Nicolas Bueno, Corporate Liability for Violations of the Human Right
to Just Conditions of Work in Extraterritorial Operations, 21(5) Int’l J. Hum. Rts. 565, 567–569 (2017).
37 CESCR, General Comment 18, supra n. 8, para. 25. See e.g. CESCR, Concluding Observations:
Japan para. 16, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/JPN/CO/3 (10 June 2013) and CESCR, Concluding
Observations: Spain para. 51, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/ESP/CO/5 (6 June 2012).
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unemployment is expected to rise by 3.4 million in 2017 reaching 201 million
people worldwide. Even among those who have a job, vulnerable forms of
employment are expected to remain above 42 per cent of total employment,
accounting for 1.4 billion people worldwide.38
2.2[b][iii] The Right to Freely Choose Work?
Although the right to freely choose work is expressly stated in Article 6 paragraph 1
ICESCR, this right has no content in international human rights law. It is interpreted
as a synonym of the right to reject forced labour as presented above.39 Yet it seems
evident that people working in the informal economy, where working conditions are
worse than in formal employment, do so because of the need to survive rather than as
a matter of choice.40 Who freely decides to work in a mine or to be a member of the
working poor? Are Spanish psychologists, in times of crisis, freely choosing to work in
call-centres? How many are working in unfulfilling, meaningless or repetitive occupa-
tions for reasons of financial hardship? Under international human rights law, all these
jobs are considered to be freely chosen as long as they are not assigned by governments
or imposed by private actors with the threat of sanctions. In reality, the right to choose
work may be seen as something of a luxury that depends on privileges in accessing
education, financial safety, talent and luck.
The right-to-work literature commonly accepts that the right to freely choose
work does not mean that the state must provide the exact job that the individual
desires.41 Elster considers it plainly unrealistic to expect everyone to do the job of
their choosing, stating that ‘[n]o individual can have a right to direct epic colour films’.42
Another question, however, could be whether it is beneficial for society to increase
opportunities for individuals to perform activities they really want to do. This contribu-
tion argues that expanding choices that allow individuals to spend their time, energy, and
skills according to their preferences is a much-overlooked source of individual and
societal benefits. Before taking a closer look at this unused potential,43 the next section
presents the economic and historical background of the right to work in order to
understand why the elements of the right to work, as summarized in Figure 1, have
never and will never be fully realized under socialist or capitalist economic systems.
Figure 1 also identifies the right not to be forced to accept indecent work and the right to
freely choose work as two under-developed rights within the right to work.
38 International Labour Organization (ILO), World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 2017
(Geneva: ILO 2016), at 1-2.
39 Collins, supra n. 13, at 21.
40 CESCR General Comment 18, supra n. 8, para. 10.
41 Sarkin-Hughes & Koenig, supra n. 18, at 10.
42 Elster, supra n. 13, at 77.
43 See s. 4.3.1 infra.
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Figure 1 The Core Elements of the Right to Work
The right to work
The right to the 
opportunity to 
gain a living by 
work
The right to 
available work
The right to equal 
access to work
The right to freely 
accept or choose 
work
The right not to 
be forced to 
accept indecent 
work ?
The right to reject 
forced work
The right to 
freely  choose 
work?
3 THE BIRTH OF THE RIGHT TO WORK UNDER SOCIALISM
AND CAPITALISM
The right to work is a universally recognized human right. Since work has become
the means by which to earn a living, it has been a recurring concern and the same
claim to work is rehearsed after each unemployment crisis. This section examines
the socialist origins of the right to work (3.1) followed by its transformation under
capitalism (3.2) and its formulation in international human rights treaties after the
Second World War (3.3). It is argued that socialism and capitalism offer different
solutions with regard to the supply of work, but that both economic systems
overlook the possibility of human potential actually reducing the necessity to
work.
3.1 THE SOCIALIST CLAIM AND ITS CRITIQUE
The first expression of the ‘right to work’ is usually attributed to the nineteenth-
century French socialists Charles Fourier44 and Louis Blanc.45 Both Fourier and
Blanc were among the ideological leaders of the French Revolution of 1848
during which the right to work became a popular demand.46
44 Nußberger, supra n. 10, para. 2.
45 See J. A. R. Marriott, The Right to Work: An Essay Introductory to the Economic History of the French
Revolution of 1848 xlvii (1919).
46 Ibid., at xviii.
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In contrast with 1789, the driving force behind the 1848 Revolution was
the ‘demand of the Parisians ouvriers for the organization of industry by the
State’.47 As Blanc explained in Le socialisme: Droit au travail, the 1848
Revolution originated from the difficulties of French industry maintaining
employment levels due to competition with England.48 To deal with the
problem of unemployment, Blanc suggested that the government should pro-
gressively play a role in the economy by means of state-aided workshops. These
state-aided workshops, according to Blanc, would at first exist side-by-side with
and compete against private enterprises until, due to increased competitiveness,
the state would progressively become the sole organizer of industry.49 Instead
of Blanc’s proposal, the right to work was implemented for the first time by
directing to national workshops all those who were in search of employment.50
A few months after the Revolution, ‘the Government, unable to fulfil its
promise of work, felt constrained to provide pay without work’ and the
national workshops experiment ended that same year.51 At its origin, then,
the right to work was a socialist claim resulting from an unemployment crisis
due to foreign competition and was meant to guarantee employment.
There were also critics of the right to work amongst socialists of the time.
In his famous book Le Droit à la paresse, Paul Lafargue considered the right to
work to be a mental aberration. He reproached the working class for proclaim-
ing it a revolutionary principle in 1848,52 which he argued, consolidated the
dogma of work preached by Christian ethicists, political economists, and
moralists.53 ‘A strange mania governs the working classes of all countries in
which capitalist civilization rules. This is the love of work, the furious mania
for work, extending to the exhaustion of the individual and his descendants.’54
He continues: ‘the political economists never tire of calling out to labourers:
“Work, work that the national wealth may be increased!”’55 And, ‘like parrots
they prattle the preaching of political economists: “Let us work to increase the
national wealth”’.56
Lafargue was inspired by his father-in-law, Karl Marx. Le droit à la paresse is not
a rejection of work, but of the capitalist system of production in which crisis
47 Ibid., at vii.
48 See Louis Blanc, Le socialisme: Droit au travail 8 (3d ed., Aux Bureaux du Nouveau Monde 1849).
49 Marriott, supra n. 45, at xliii.
50 Ibid., at lxx.
51 Ibid., at lxxi.
52 Paul Lafargue, The Right to Be Lazy: Being a Refutation of the ‘Right to Work’ of 1848, 11 (Harriet E.
Lothrop trans., Standard Publishing 1904) (1880).
53 See ibid., at 5.
54 Ibid., at 5.
55 Ibid., at 16.
56 Ibid., at 34.
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follows crisis, always at the expense of the workers.57 For Lafargue, however, the
proletariat ‘must proclaim the Rights of Laziness [and] accustom itself to working
but three hours a day, reserving the rest of the day and night for leisure and
feasting’58 to arrive at the realization of its strength. Although he did not explain
how to achieve this goal, his book explains that workers in capitalist societies are
ready to give up their right not to be forced to accept indecent work in order to
avoid the worst-case scenario: unemployment.
Later, in his collection of essays In Praise of Idleness, published in 1932, Bertrand
Russell shared Lafargue’s idea that ‘far too much work was done in the world’.59
According to him, ‘modern technique made it possible for leisure’60 by diminishing
enormously the amount of labour required to secure the necessities of life for
everyone.61 Russell deplored how, by regarding the virtue of hard work as an end
in itself, capitalism led workers to produce things that were not wanted and socialism
made people work on useless projects instead of increasing leisure.62 He estimated
that, assuming a moderate amount of sensible organization,63 about four hours’ work
a day would provide the worker with the necessities and elementary comforts of life,
and that the rest of his time should be his to use as he saw fit.64 Russell did not
elaborate on the kind of ‘organization’ that was required, nor did he define ‘the
necessities and elementary comforts of life’. However, his essay argues that the right
to leisure is of greater value than the right to work, since work is only the means to
achieve leisure. Section 4 will develop this argument in the human economy.
3.2 REJECTION AND TRANSFORMATION UNDER CAPITALISM
In France, the socialist right to guaranteed employment was strongly opposed by
critics such as Alexis de Tocqueville, who feared state control of the entire
economy as the state would thus become the sole owner of all property.65 The
same fear of communism was widespread in England. In The Right to Work,
published in 1911 in The Edinburgh Review, an anonymous author rejected the
claim formulated in the Unemployed Workmen Bill of 1908 that every workman
57 Ibid., at 20.
58 This passage is missing in Lothrop’s translation, supra n. 52. See Paul Lafargue, The Right to Be Lazy 29
(Charles H. Kerr transl., Charles Kerr and Co ed. 1907) (1880).
59 Bertrand Russell, In Praise of Idleness: And Other Essays 9 (3rd impr., Allen & Unwin 1936).
60 Ibid., at 14.
61 Ibid., at 15.
62 Ibid., at 23.
63 Ibid., at.18.
64 Ibid., at 25.
65 See Alexis de Tocqueville, Discours à l’Assemblée nationale, (Sept. 11, 1848), in Le droit au travail à
l’Assemblée nationale: recueil complet de tous les discours prononcés dans cette mémorable discussion 101 (Joseph
Garnier ed., 1848).
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not in employment had the right to work.66 This would force the state to enter into
contracts with unemployed persons67: ‘if the work were really wanted, the State
would naturally offer the work, and so would not require to be constrained’.68
According to the author, the right to work was thus a claim to government funding
for unemployed persons to do unnecessary work that would be carried out to the
detriment of the general wealth of the country.69 Although the article does not
outline any solution to deal with unemployment, it presents unemployed persons in
a capitalist system of production as unable to contribute to society, and the right to
work as an unnecessary cost for society.
The right to work, however, was quickly accepted under capitalism. In The
Right to Work, written in 1917 by John Elliot Ross at a time of high unemploy-
ment in the United States,70 the right to work is presented as the means to end the
‘evils of unemployment’.71 Ross suggested that ‘more than a minimum wage;
[there is a] need also to provide the opportunity of working for such [a] wage’.72
For the ‘self-respecting, capable unemployed’,73 he recommended the provision of
better information about available jobs, employment bureaus and a system of
compulsory social insurance.74 In 1917, he seemed to be describing something
similar to the workfare system: ‘If an applicant for insurance refused to work for a
private employer when the opportunity was offered him, he should forfeit his right
to insurance.’75 Addressing the right to freely choose work, he argued that it
would be useless to ‘attempt giving each man his own special kind of work’.76 The
state should rather have some sort of basic activity to which men could be put to
work when they could find nothing else to do.77 Turning to those ‘defective in
some way that makes their employment unprofitable’,78 Ross found it useless to
urge employers to take them on. Instead, he saw the need to set up ‘special
institutions where such persons can be employed up to their full capacity whatever
that may be’79 in order for them not to lose the habit of work.
66 The Right to Work, 214 The Edinburgh Rev. 180 (1911).
67 Ibid., at 185.
68 Ibid., at 188.
69 Ibid., at 189.
70 Stanley Lebergott, Annual Estimates of Unemployment in the United States, 1900–1954, in The
Measurement and Behavior of Unemployment 211, 214 (Universities-National Bureau Committee for
Economic Research ed., 1957).
71 John Elliott Ross, The Right to Work 9 (1917).
72 Ibid., at 28.
73 Ibid., at 73.
74 Ibid., at 46.
75 Ibid., at 62; see s. 2.2[b][ii] supra, for the contemporary discussion.
76 Ross, supra n. 71, at 74.
77 Ibid., at 77; see s. 2.2[b][iii] supra, for the contemporary discussion.
78 Ross, supra n. 71, at 82.
79 Ibid., at 93.
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The Right to Work shows the transformation of the right to work from a
socialist guarantee of employment towards a right to a labour market that extends
the opportunity to work. That transformation became increasingly accepted in
capitalist societies as shown, for example, in the adoption of the first International
Labour Organization (ILO) conventions addressing unemployment.80 The right to
work understood by Ross a century ago is close to what is understood as the
contemporary right to work. National socialism added a dark chapter to the history
of the right to work, ultimately leading to the inclusion of the right to freely accept
and choose work in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
3.3 THE ‘RIGHT-WING’ SOCIALIST CLAIM
In the period following the Great Depression, the right to work became the
perfect claim for nationalism in Europe and Russia. In The Right to Work in
1939, Max Ascoli described how the right to work in Soviet Russia and Nazi
Germany completely lost the left-wing political character it had since the 1848
French Revolution.81 He noted that ‘in Germany, th[e] right [to work] seems to
have actually received its sanction, from the hands of Hitler who, we are told, has
abolished unemployment’.82 As he explained, however, an effective organization
of the right to work implies agencies for the distribution of work. ‘If the men who
are at the head of such agencies centre their will only upon the right to work and
nullify all other rights, a situation arises which has a name: slavery.’83 For Ascoli,
slavery was what Germany and Russia were experiencing:
The workers are conscripted; they cannot change their jobs; not even old age seems to
create an exemption from the duty of working, as is evident in Germany where men up to
seventy years of age are called to do their part in national projects. Needless to say, in
Germany and Russia all workers’ rights are denied at the same time as the right to work is
made thoroughly effective.84
The compulsory allocation of labour continued in Russia after the Second World
War, which inspired China’s allocation system of labour of the 1950s. In China, Lu
explains that whilst work assignments might have taken personal skills into
account, the free will of the worker would be the last element considered.85
Workers were not forced to accept the job but normally only had a choice
80 See e.g. Convention (No. 2) Concerning Unemployment, 28 Nov. 1919, 38 U.N.T.S. 585;
Convention (No. 8) Concerning Unemployment Indemnity in Case of Loss or Foundering of the
Ship, 9 July 1920, U.N.T.S. 591.
81 Max Ascoli, The Right to Work, 6 Soc. Res. 255, 256 (1939).
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., at 260.
84 Ibid.
85 Lu, supra n. 11, at 231.
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between taking the job or not being employed at all and relying exclusively on
family support since a labour market did not exist.86
The right to work was discussed during the drafting of the UDHR and the
ICESCR in the post-Second World War context. Some thought that the right
to work was a cost for society or, at best, that governments should only
promote economic conditions to increase the opportunity to work.87 Those
ideas were opposed by socialist governments willing to guarantee work88
through a state-allocated labour system under which the right to freely accept
or choose work was a secondary or non-existing concern. Today, the clash
between socialism and capitalism has mostly vanished but the debate continues
about whether and to what extent states should intervene in order to provide
enough work. This article argues that the debate places too much attention on
how to provide work. It overlooks the human potential to reduce the need to
work.
4 FREEDOM FROM WORK IN THE HUMAN ECONOMY
Section 2 above provided an overview of the human right to work as a right to the
opportunity to make a living through freely accepted work, but not necessarily
freely chosen work. Section 3 showed how the contemporary right to work
emerged historically from competing views between socialism and capitalism on
how to supply work. As already mentioned above, despite the universally recog-
nized human right to work, global unemployment is expected to reach 201 million
and vulnerable forms of employment are expected to account for 1.4 billion people
worldwide.89 In the contemporary global economy, in which workers are increas-
ingly exposed to global competition and continue to be exposed to labour-saving
technologies, Collins is perhaps correct when he says that the right to work is
impracticable.90 For instance, with regard to technological innovation, the United
Nations reports that some estimate that by 2025 almost 50% of today’s occupations
could become redundant. New jobs will require creativity, intelligence, social skills
and the ability to exploit artificial intelligence.91 One can also agree with Nickel
86 Ibid.
87 See Sarkin-Hughes & Koenig, supra n. 18, at 13.
88 See e.g. G. A., Third Comm., Draft International Declaration on Human Rights: Recapitulation of
Amendments to Article 21 of the Draft Declaration, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/298 (25 Oct. 1948); see also
Sarkin-Hughes & Koenig, supra n. 18, at 13.
89 International Labour Organization (ILO), World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 2017 1–2
(Geneva: ILO 2016).
90 Collins, supra n. 13, at 19.
91 U.N. Development Programme [UNDP], Human Development Report: Work for Human
Development 5 (2015) [hereinafter UNDP Human Development Report]., at 98.
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that the right to work does not have a bright future92 at least for all those who are
unable to acquire the required new skills.
It is unlikely that comprehensive solutions will emerge from reusing
socialist or capitalist instruments that focus only on providing work. Harvey
suggests, for example, reviving the direct job-creation strategy of the United
States adopted after the Great Depression.93 This section presents an alternative
approach in the human economy framework. This section outlines the defini-
tional and theoretical framework of the human economy, which is a more
precise concept than it is in Hart’s Human Economy.94 It is also not related to
Röpke’s 1960s Humane Economy.95 Although Röpke was aware that the free
market needs an ethical framework with humane values,96 ‘humane’ meant for
him above all else ‘free market’ as opposed to the communist ‘extreme anti-
humane doctrine’.97
The human economy framework first of all challenges the core principle of
capitalism according to which human beings constitute a form of productive
capital (4.1). The framework shows that the present economic system reduces
human beings to capital with the single skill of producing economic value. It
therefore overlooks the human potential to create human benefits beyond produ-
cing goods and services (4.2). It also explains that improving the efficient creation
of human benefits, which is what most people work for, can reduce a society’s
need to work (4.3). The human economy represents a shift in perspective from
fulfilling the traditional right to work to progressively increasing freedom from
work.
4.1 FROM HUMAN CAPITAL TO HUMAN BEING
Among influential economists, Smith, Mill, and Marx each analysed the function
of human labour in the capitalist system of production. They examined human
labour as productive capital to be purchased by private employers, something Marx
criticized in a systematic manner.98 The metamorphosis of human beings into
92 James W. Nickel, Giving Up on the Right to Work, in The Right to Work, supra n. 6, at 137.
93 Harvey, supra n. 9, at 167.
94 Keith Hart, Jean-Louis Laville & Antonio Cattani, Building the Human Economy Together, in The Human
Economy 2 (Hart et al. eds, Polity Press 2010).
95 Wilhelm Röpke, A Humane Economy: The Social Framework of the Free Market (1960).
96 Ibid., at 104. See Werner Bonefeld, Human Economy and Social Policy: On Ordoliberalism and Political
Authority, 26 (2) Hist. Hum. Sc. 106, 112(2013).
97 Röpke, supra n. 95, at 16.
98 See Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations: Books I-III 429–449 (Penguin 1999) (1776), for Book II, Ch.
III on the Accumulation of Capital, or of Productive and Unproductive Labour; See John Stuart Mill,
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human capital was complete by the second half of the twentieth century, as
outlined in Becker’s Human Capital.99 Today, the paradoxical term human capital
is commonly accepted. By oversimplifying human beings in the economic process
of production, however, traditional economics reduces human beings to one single
function: producing economic value. This explains the disconnect between eco-
nomics and human realities, which becomes obvious when considering the eco-
nomic notion of ‘skills’.
In the economic literature, skills only mean skills that are instrumental to produ-
cing economic value. In an awareness that young people will provide human capital
upon completion of their schooling, the education system mostly prepares them to
acquire the particular skills needed to become employable capital.100 As Frayne argues
in The Refusal of Work, ‘in the work-centred society, the most readily accepted purpose
of education is the socialization of young people for the successful adoption of pre-
defined work role’.101 Are those skills that are taught and trained out of fear of
unemployment the ones that enable human beings to make the maximum use of
their potential for themselves and others in society? It is easy to agree with Frayne that,
for many, paid employment represents less an expression of their creative capacities
than an obstacle to the development of those capacities.102
The human economy approach considers that human beings have human potential
beyond merely the ‘skill’ to produce economic value. The next sections argue that
human beings have the potential to create human benefits beyond producing goods
and services and that this potential is either misallocated or not allocated at all in the
contemporary economic system, which impacts a society’s need to work.
4.2 FROM PRODUCTION TO HUMAN BENEFITS
Once human beings are delivered from being thought of as mere producers of
economic value, a part of the time and energy that was before only dedicated to
producing goods and services can be used in order to create something else. But
what can individuals create with their human potential? Human benefits.
Principles of Political Economy: With Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy; Books I-II (1848),
reprinted in Collected works of John Stuart Mill 2, 31 (John M. Robson ed., 1965), for Book I, Ch.
II, Of Labour as an Agent of Production and Ch. III, Of Unproductive Labour. See Karl Marx,
Capital: A Critique of Political Economy vol. 1 (1st Engl. ed. 1887), reprinted in Karl Marx & Frederick
Engels: Collected Works 35, at 196–208 (Progress Publ. 1996), in particular the section on The
Producing of Surplus-Value.
99 Gary Becker, Human Capital (3d ed., University of Chicago Press 1993).
100 See Muhammad Yunus, Building Social Business: The New Kind of Capitalism That Serves Humanity’s
Most Pressing Needs xvi (Public Affairs 2010); see also David Frayne, The Refusal of Work: The Theory and
Practice of Resistance to Work 78–81 (Zed Books 2015).
101 Ibid., at 15.
102 Ibid., at 66. But see Davidov, supra n. 3, at 43 or Bogg, supra n. 1, at 150.
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It is increasingly accepted that production growth, or economic growth, is not
the most desirable end that economics can offer to human beings. Many economic
theories have attempted to link and measure economic activities in terms of social
rather than economic outputs, such as the social economy.103 In this connection
Amartya Sen helped transform an abstract idea of social outputs into more precise
benefits to which people can individually relate. As Sen argues in Development as
Freedom, ‘economic growth cannot be treated as an end in itself. Development has
to be more concerned with enhancing the lives we lead and the freedoms we
enjoy’.104 He evaluates an economic system in terms of capabilities. Capabilities are
the substantive freedoms a person enjoys to lead the kind of life he or she has
reason to value.105 The United Nations translates Sen’s idea of capabilities into the
broader notion of human development.106
Some capabilities are broadly shared, such as the freedom to live a healthy life,
to have access to quality food, clean water, education and housing or lead a life free
from violence. Broadly shared capabilities can be translated into existing universally
recognized human rights.107 As Sen wrote, however, capabilities and human rights
should not be subsumed within the other and the acceptability of existing human
rights must also continue to be assessed by some test of open, informed108 and
deliberative109 scrutiny. This is certainly true for the human right to work. For
example, Del Punta recently identified the following capabilities in relation to work:
having a job, having working conditions compatible with the worker’s health and
safety, having adequate occupational training, as well as the capabilities to enjoy a
sufficient amount of work-free time and to join trade unions.110 His analysis
presupposes, however, that people freely want to work. Considering that most
people are forced to work in order to earn an income, capabilities that are connected
to work would be more ambitious and encompass also the capability of freely
choosing work or achieving a standard of living by working as little as possible,
that is freedom from work, which are not yet recognized human rights.
103 See Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-
Market Era 242 (Putnam 1995); citing Thierry Jeantet, La modernisation de la France par l’économie sociale
(Economica 1986).
104 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom 14 (Oxford University Press 2001).
105 Ibid., at 75.
106 UNDP Human Development Report, supra n. 91, at 1.
107 Martha Nussbaum, Capabilities, Entitlements, Rights: Supplementation and Critique, 12 J. Hum. Dev.
Capabilities 23, 24 (2011); Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Capabilities, 6 J. Hum. Dev. 151, 152
(2005).
108 Ibid., at 160.
109 Balakrishnan, Heintz & Elson, Rethinking Economic Policy for Social Justice: The Radical Potential of Human
Rights 8 (Routledge 2016).
110 Riccardo Del Punta, Labour Law and the Capability Approach, 32(4) Intl. J. Comp. Lab. L. & Indus. Rel.
383, 390 (2016).
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In Rethinking Economic Policy for Social Justice: The Radical Potential of Human
Rights, Balakrishnan, Heintz and Elson adopted human rights as a framework for
assessing and measuring economic outcomes.111 The human economy approach
presented in this contribution is a continuity of these developments. Regarding
terminology in the human economy, economic activities that improve capabilities,
measured in terms of human rights, are creating human benefits. Conversely, an
activity that reduces capabilities expressed in human rights causes human costs.
Human potential thus means the potential to create human benefits.
The argument behind the human economy, to be developed in the next
section, is that activities that create human benefits increase freedom from work
while activities causing human costs increase the necessity to work. Developing
labour-saving technology for agriculture, for example, may give rise to human
benefits measured in terms of the human right to food. As food is more efficiently
produced, people need to work less to secure this human benefit and society’s
freedom from work increases in that regard. That same technological innovation,
however, may also give rise to human costs, such as social instability or violence
associated with loss of employment as for other labour-saving technologies.112 While
on the one hand freedom from work increases for some, the necessity to work will
also increase for all those who must work more to cover the costs of private and
public measures to provide protection from social instability. Furthermore, if the
labour-saving technology consists of using pesticides, human costs measured in terms
of the human right to health or to clean water must also be accounted for. The
necessity to work will increase for all those who must work more to cover the cost
of remedial measures, such as cleaning water or tackling pesticide-related diseases.
Economic models that focus on production growth are incomplete. Under the
human economy approach, an economic activity is humanly beneficial only on
condition that it results in the net creation of human benefits and thus increases
freedom from work. Internationally recognized human rights can be used as a
standard to measure human benefits created by economic activities.113 More
research is needed, however, to quantify the extent to which human benefits
and human costs impact the necessity to work. A better understanding of this
relationship would help individuals who wish to be less reliant on work to adapt
their behaviour and redesign public policies accordingly. The last section casts light
on how improving the efficient creation of human benefits increases a society’s
freedom from work.
111 Balakrishnan, Heintz & Elson, supra n. 109, at 2 and 142.
112 See Rifkin, supra n. 103, Ch. 14, for the relationship between technological unemployment and social
instability. See more recently, Joseph Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society
Endangers Our Future (W. W. Norton 2013).
113 As proposed by Balakrishnan, Heintz & Elson, supra n. 109.
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4.3 FROM THE EFFICIENT CREATION OF HUMAN BENEFITS TO FREEDOM FROM WORK
Economics is about making the best use of resources. Capitalism is about making
the best use of capital, including human capital, so as to maximize production. A
correlation may exist between producing some goods and services and the resulting
human benefits or improvements in human rights. It is also the case that the
number of hours that people need to work has decreased in the last few decades,
at least for most individuals in wealthier countries.114 However, the correlation
between capitalism, improvement of rights and freedom from work is poorly
measured. It is also not accurate to say that the contemporary economic system
is the most efficient economic system for expanding freedom from work for the
simple reason that capitalism does not recognize freedom from work as an
indicator.
The human economy, to the contrary, is about making the best use of human
potential, the new input of the economic system, to maximize human benefits, the
new output, with the view to reducing a society’s necessity to rely on work. This
section identifies the waste of human potential (4.3[a]) and explains how enhan-
cing the free use of human potential (4.3[b]) and increasing human creativity (4.3
[c]) reduces the necessity to work (4.3[d]).
4.3[a] Wasted Human Potential
To date, those who freely choose to make use of their human potential to create
human benefits, as defined above,115 are generally rewarded less or not at all. The
contemporary system of employment mostly rewards the skill of producing eco-
nomic value.116 This system creates an incentive to improve that economic skill
over time without regard to whether the use of that skill gives rise to human
benefits or human costs. As a result, the human potential of creating human
benefits is wasted.
In the present economic system, the same skill can be rewarded very differently.
Take the example of legal skills. If individual economic rewards and the social status
that is associated with this reward were irrelevant, most lawyers would, hypotheti-
cally, prefer to defend the rights of people affected by water pollution rather than
defending the company causing the pollution. This may be all the more so when the
company produces goods that generate limited human benefits. In practice,
114 See e.g. OECD Statistics, Average annual hours actually worked per workers 2000–2016, from 1829
hours in 2000 to 1763 in 2016, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANHRS (last
accessed 31 July 2017).
115 See s. 4.2, supra.
116 See also Yunus, supra n. 100, at xv.
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however, economic opportunities lead a majority of lawyers to use their skill to
defend the polluting company rather than those affected in their human right to
water. At the same time, lawyers justify themselves: ‘What can I do? I have to earn a
living!’ They also take comfort in the fact that if they do not provide their services,
someone else will. Comments of this kind are common for many kinds of activities.
Each of them represents a typical case of human potential being misallocated.
Unemployment is another example of wasted potential. Those who are not
productive enough to be hired are considered unnecessary in capitalist societies.117
However, being unemployed does not mean that people have no human potential.
The loss of human potential when young people spend time in employment
agencies in the hope of finding a job they do not want is surely regrettable. As
the United Nations stated in its last Human Development Report, focusing on
work for human development, a great deal of human potential remains unused and
the world is deprived of their contribution, creativity and innovation.118 In both
situations, there is a waste of human potential due to a lack of opportunities for
those who wish to create human benefits.
4.3[b] Enhancing the Free Use of Human Potential
Enhancing the free use of human potential means creating individual opportunities
for those who wish to improve and use their potential. In connection with this
point, the literature on the right to work discusses a universal basic income.119
Another approach aims to empower the voluntary sector. These two approaches
will now be assessed in light of the human economy framework.
With regard to basic income, Standing argues that such an income would help
to enable people to gain control of the pace and intensity of their work, and to
escape from the remorseless dictates of labourism.120 In his view, the economic
rationale behind basic income is that most countries already provide a vast array of
subsidies designed to maintain or generate unproductive jobs.121 Others identify
costly bureaucratic welfare programmes as an additional economic reason to
replace them with such an income.122 Beyond these questions, which will have
117 See Marx, Vol. 1, supra n. 98, at 624.
118 UNDP Human Development Report, supra n. 91, at 46.
119 See Guy Standing, Why a Basic Income Is Necessary for a Right to Work, 7 Basic Income Stud. (2013); see
also Yannick Vanderborght, The Tensions of Welfare State Reform and the Potential of a Universal Basic
Income, in Activation Policies for the Unemployed: The Right to Work and the Duty to Work 209, 209–222
(Elise Dermine ed., Lang 2014); Sarkin-Hughes & Koenig, supra n. 18, at 4; De Schutter, supra n. 33,
at 175.
120 Standing, supra n. 119, at 34.
121 Ibid., at 32.
122 Rifkin, supra n. 103 at 261, citing Friedman; see also Standing, supra n. 119, at 34.
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to be examined, it seems clear that people working eight to ten hours a day
dedicated to the production of goods and services cannot find the time to think
creatively in terms of human benefits and their human potential may be lost. It is
also probable that ensuring a basic income will liberate those badly remunerated
and who work out of necessity to refocus on other preferred occupations. It is also
correct to assume that a basic income will allow people already providing unpaid
care to continue to do so. It is incorrect, however, to assume that the new
occupations will automatically generate more human benefits.123 A basic income
may also divert human potential away from economically unattractive but creative
activities in terms of human benefits. One can easily think of nurses, for instance,
creating human benefits in terms of the right to health under hard working
conditions. Although the idea of a basic income and the human economy do
not exclude each other, the literature on the basic income should address the issue
of human potential more carefully.
The literature also discusses how to encourage participation in the third sector124
with reference to voluntary work alongside the private and public sectors.125 Rifkin
suggests that governments could provide a tax deduction for every hour of voluntary
work for certified tax-exempt organizations.126 In the human economy, taxation
could also be used to encourage work that creates human benefits. Such incentives
would directly reward individuals who use their human potential to create human
benefits, maybe in addition to the basic income, which applies universally. There is no
reason, however, to assume that only the third sector is worth encouraging. Identified
and collectively agreed-upon human benefits can be created through work in the
private or public sectors just as in the third sector. Furthermore, it is not only state-
driven public policies that can provide economic incentives. Economic incentives can
also be created through individual choices and collective action, for example, by
investing in social businesses as defined by Yunus127 or putting savings into social
banking, provided the social can be translated into specific human benefits. Finally,
individual rewards other than economic incentives may also enhance the free use of
human potential. More room should be given to those who want to use their human
potential to define their own form of incentive.
The remaining question is what can motivate individuals, beyond what is already
achieved through a shared understanding of respect for others, to create opportunities
for those who want to create human benefits. Before showing how the perspective of
123 See Frayne, supra n. 100, at 66, for comments on the potential for people’s capacities to flourish when
work is reduced.
124 Rifkin, supra n. 103 at 249–274.
125 Ibid., at 239.
126 Ibid., at 256.
127 Yunus, supra n. 100, at 12; see UNDP Human Development Report, supra n. 91, at 8 and 97.
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increasing one’s own freedom from work may work as a motivating force, the notion
of human creativity in the human economy needs to be examined.
4.3[c] Increasing Human Creativity
In addition to expanding opportunities for work in sectors that create human
benefits, the human economy approach focuses on increasing human creativity. In
the human economy framework, human creativity means the potential to create
human benefits with a given amount of resources. It aims to replace the existing
economic concept of productivity.128 For example, a Swedish university hospital
undertook an experiment whereby they paid nurses a full salary to work six hours a
day instead of the usual eight hours.129 The 18-months experiment showed that
providing individual rewards to nurses by reducing the working day improved the
attractiveness of the work as well as the quantity and quality of health services
provided. The nurses increased their productivity by organizing 85% more activ-
ities for their patients. In this example, productivity can also be measured in
specific human benefits in terms of the human right to health. Human labour
productivity is therefore a synonym of human creativity in this particular case.
In the human economy framework, increasing human creativity requires
improving the skill of creating human benefits, not productive skills in the
economic sense. In the contemporary economic system, those who wish to
learn how to improve their skill of creating human benefits – their human
creativity – face higher risks in investing in their human potential because the
use of human potential is generally less rewarded, if it is rewarded at all.130
Creating opportunities for the allocation of human potential would reduce that
risk. Education could then move progressively from learning how to produce
economic value to focusing instead on how to create human benefits more
efficiently. As individuals become increasingly creative in terms of human
benefits, one can easily imagine technological innovations and their conse-
quence in terms of human benefits that would emerge from that human
creativity. With human benefits becoming more efficiently created, freedom
from work would expand.
Table 1 summarizes the definitional framework of the human economy as
presented so far and compares it with terminology commonly employed in the
capitalist system. Then the last section examines how and why society’s freedom
from work increases when human benefits are more efficiently created.
128 See s. 4.2, supra.
129 Mady Savage, What really happened when Swedes tried six-hour days? BBC News (Feb. 8, 2017)
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-38843341 (accessed 24 Oct. 2017).
130 See s. 4.3.1, supra.
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Table 1 Definitional Framework of the Human Economy in Comparison to Capitalism
Capitalism Human Economy
Agents and its power Human Capital, Labour Human Beings, Human
Potential
Function of agents Producers of goods and
services
Creators of Human Benefits
Rewarded skill Economic Productivity Human Creativity
Output Goods and Services Human Benefits, Human
Costs
Purpose of the
economic system
Economic Growth, Material
Security, Full Employment
Securing Human Benefits,
Increasing Freedom from
Work
4.3[d] Towards Freedom from Work
Why would governments redirect public policies and why would individuals
modify their behaviour to enhance the free use of human potential and increase
human creativity? Because this could potentially reduce everyone’s need to
work. In the human economy, freedom from work becomes a new motivating
force.
Individuals rely on work from which they earn an income enabling them
to secure choices. Some of those choices can be expressed in terms of
capabilities and measured in human rights, such as the right to adequate
food, water, housing or health.131 These choices represent human benefits
and they are why most people need to work. When those benefits are more
efficiently created, the need to work to access them reduces. An increase in
human creativity in the health sector, for example, reduces the cost of acces-
sing human benefits in terms of the right to health, a human benefit for which
most people must work. Most people therefore benefit from such an increase
in human creativity by reducing the amount of necessary work to access that
human benefit. This is true for all improvements in human creativity and for
all technological inventions that improve the efficient creation of human
131 See s. 4.2 supra, for the relationship between human rights and human benefits.
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benefits. When human creativity increases, freedom from work increases
because less work is needed to access human benefits.
Introducing the idea of human benefits and human costs brings clarification
to the ‘end of work’ argument, which is based on the assumption that advances
in production technologies are gradually eliminating the need for human
labour.132 This is a manifestation of Russell’s idea of modern technologies
diminishing the amount of labour required to secure the necessities of life for
everyone133 and making leisure time possible.134 At present, however, techno-
logical innovation can also contribute to human costs and thus increase a
society's need to work.
Coming back to an example presented above,135 pesticides are considered as a
labour-saving technology that improves economic productivity and potentially
reduces the reliance on work to secure the right to food. At the same time,
pesticides are an example of a technology that constrains a society to work in
order to fund measures that protect against social instability resulting from a loss of
employment, as well as to ensure access to clean water and treat pesticide-related
diseases. Traditional economics has a reason to celebrate this technology as addi-
tional work is created at the expense of those who will pay for these measures,
either individually or collectively as taxpayers.
The question regarding technologies is, as Frayne asks, to what and whose
ends are new technologies being applied?136 Is improvement in economic pro-
ductivity through technologies necessarily reducing a society’s necessity to work?
Human creativity, not economic productivity, reduces the need to rely on work.
Only work and technology resulting in a net creation of human benefits will
reduce the need to work. Then choices expand as freedom from work grows.
There is a need to clarify the relationship between economic productivity, human
creativity and freedom from work in order to motivate those who wish to be less
reliant on work to adapt their individual behaviour and influence public policies
accordingly.
5 CONCLUSION
Work is a human right and most governments formally recognize it as such. At the
universal level, the right to work is about increasing the opportunity for individuals
132 See Frayne, supra n. 100, at 33; see generally Rifkin, supra n. 103, at 3–13, for a critique of the argument.
133 Russell, supra n. 59, at 14.
134 Ibid., at 15.
135 See s. 4.2, supra.
136 Frayne, supra n. 100, at 34.
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to access decent work without discrimination. Furthermore, under the human
right to work, work cannot be assigned by force, which means that it must be
freely accepted. Work should also be freely chosen. The idea that work is freely
chosen is for many workers no more than a bad joke. Considering economic
realities, the right to freely choose work has no practical content in human
rights law. Street cleaners, call-centre agents, industrial workers or bankers and
even members of the working poor are considered to have freely chosen their
jobs. In this article, the right to choose work is part of a solution to reduce the
reliance on work.
Historically, the right to work originates from the competing views of
socialism and capitalism. The official birth of the right to work goes back to the
1848 French Revolution, when unemployed workers argued that the state
should guarantee work. This right to the guarantee to work was progressively
transformed in capitalist societies into a right to the opportunity to work. Past
and present solutions, however, have invariably focused on who – the state or
private employers – is the most suitable and efficient supplier of work. Both
economic systems place insufficient attention on how to reduce a society’s
necessity to work.
This article presents the human economy approach as an alternative to the
traditional challenging task of supplying enough decent work to implement the
right to work. It follows the idea that it is easier to guarantee the security which
people seek through work when work becomes less and less necessary to make a
living. In the human economy, workers are not a form of human capital, but
human beings with human potential. They can create human benefits, for which
most people must work at present. The human economy puts in place individual
incentives to enhance the free use of human potential and increase human crea-
tivity in order to improve the efficient creation of human benefits. Improving the
efficient creation of these human benefits, rather than increasing economic pro-
ductivity, reduces the reliance on work to access benefits that people work for,
thus increasing a society’s freedom from work.
The human economy is one possible way towards Lafargue’s goal for work to
last no longer than three hours a day,137 something that Keynes also predicted by
2030,138or to achieve Marx’s more general aim of freedom from exploitation.139
The human economy is also not about securing only ‘elementary comforts of life’
137 Lafargue, supra n. 52, at 25.
138 John Maynard Keynes, Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren (1930), reprinted in The Collected
Writings of John Maynard Keynes 9, 329 (Macmillan 1972).
139 See Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy vol. 3, 958–959 (Frederick Engels ed., David
Fernbach, transl., Penguin 1991) (1894).
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as in Russell's essay In Praise of Idleness.140 Focusing on overlooked human potential
as well as the neglected impact of human costs on the need to work may render it
possible to increase freedom from work and simultaneously to secure a wider range
of human benefits. To increase freedom from work, there is no way out but to
analyse more carefully what people create and destroy through work and under-
stand better why people work.
140 Russell, supra n. 59, at 25.
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